No. 101

Reading needs no key.

Each vendor puts the same facts in different places. rackhands knows where to look and gives every box the same shape: inventory, health rollup, sensors, event log, power, firmware, boot order. You get a table for you, JSON for scripts, and structured tool results for agents.

$ rackhands health
CRITICAL  db-01   (Dell, via redfish)
   Critical  subsystem power supplies  — iDRAC rollup
   Critical  psu PS2 Status            — reading 0 W
CRITICAL  web-07  (HPE, via redfish)
   Warning   subsystem Fans            — iLO aggregate health
   Critical  fan Fan 3                 — reading 0 %
OK        k8s-12  (Lenovo, via redfish)
WARNING   x11-bk  (Supermicro, via redfish)
   Warning   voltage VBAT              — reading 2.71 V
WARNING   lab-x10 (Supermicro, via ipmi (fallback))
   Warning   temperature PSU2 Temp     — reading 117 C

Same question, four dialects
	Dell iDRAC	HPE iLO	Lenovo XCC	Supermicro
Hardware log	LogServices/Sel	LogServices/IML	LogServices/PlatformLog	Managers/1/LogServices/Log1
Health rollup	Oem.Dell.DellSystem *RollupStatus	Oem.Hpe.AggregateHealthStatus	Status.HealthRollup	Status.HealthRollup
Sensors	Thermal + Power	Thermal + Power (0 = no threshold)	Sensors collection	Thermal + Power
Virtual media	standard InsertMedia	Oem.Hpe InsertVirtualMedia	standard InsertMedia	OEM only on X11

No. 102

Two keys and a signature.

Power, boot override, BMC reset, firmware update and virtual media are off until you open them. Like a deposit box, each one needs both keys:

The vault key, --allow power, given when you start rackhands. Over MCP, a class you didn't allow is not even listed as a tool.
The renter's key, allow: [power], on that box in targets.yaml. A typo in the target name can't reach a box nobody opened.
The register. You type the box's name, or pass --yes db-01. An agent gets a plan and a single-use token bound to that exact request. It hands the token back only after you say yes. Every plan and execution is written to the audit log.

One box at a time: all and tag: work for reads and are refused for anything dangerous.

PLAN power force-off db-01 (Dell PowerEdge R750, ResetType=ForceOff, currently On) POST /redfish/v1/Systems/System.Embedded.1/Actions/ComputerSystem.Reset via redfish DONE db-01: accepted (HTTP 204)

Sign the register: type the box name to force it off

$ rackhands power db-01 force-off rackhands: operation not allowed: "power" is off; start with --allow power (dangerous operations are disabled by default) exit 3

No. 103

When Redfish isn't home, IPMI answers.

Give a box both addresses. rackhands asks Redfish first and falls back to IPMI 2.0 (lanplus) when Redfish is unreachable, missing the feature, or answers 404, 501 or 503. It never falls back on a bad password, so a wrong credential is not hidden by trying again on another protocol. Older Supermicro and Dell boards, and cheap boards that only speak IPMI, give the same health, sensors, SEL, FRU inventory and power. Every result says which protocol answered.

$ rackhands --json inventory lab-x10 | jq '{via, fallback_reason}'
{
  "via": "ipmi (fallback)",
  "fallback_reason": "redfish unreachable (connection refused)"
}

No. 104

For agents: same binary, `rackhands mcp`.

Read tools carry readOnlyHint and work out of the box: get_health, get_sensors, get_event_log, get_inventory, get_firmware_inventory, get_boot_config, get_power_state, list_targets. Dangerous tools exist only if you start the server with --allow. Even then, the first call returns a plan and a token. The second call needs that token, and the server's instructions tell the agent to get your yes first. If it reuses the token, changes the action, or waits two minutes, it is refused.

{"mcpServers": {"rackhands": {
  "command": "rackhands",
  "args": ["mcp"],
  "env": {"BMC_PASSWORD": "…"}
}}}

→ power_action {target: "db-01", action: "force-off"}
← {"status": "confirmation_required",
   "plan": {…}, "confirm_token": "rh1-…"}
→ power_action {…, confirm_token: "rh1-…"}
← {"status": "done", "result": "accepted (HTTP 204)"}

No. 105

Tested against a real Redfish service and a real IPMI BMC.

Every push runs the binary against the DMTF Redfish-Mockup-Server. It serves DMTF's own mockup plus Dell R750, HPE DL380, Lenovo SR650 V2 and Supermicro X11 mockups that carry each vendor's quirks. It also runs against OpenIPMI's ipmi_sim over a real lanplus session. CI checks vendor detection, health, logs and sensors, and every refusal path. It checks that a boot override PATCH persists, and that IPMI chassis power goes off and comes back on. It also drives the MCP server over stdio through the full plan → token → done flow.

No. 106

Install

$ go install github.com/Blackman99/rackhands/cmd/rackhands@latest
# or a single static binary for linux / macOS / windows (amd64, arm64):
# https://github.com/Blackman99/rackhands/releases/latest
$ rackhands --host https://10.20.0.11 --user root health

Read the docs: config file, every command, vendor notes, the safety model, MCP setup and exit codes.

Article: Giving an AI agent your BMCs without the power button · 中文版